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THE SOUTH CAROLINA UNINSURED
MOTORIST LAW*
WmLIAM W. DoAR, JR.t and DONALD V. RICHARDSON, III$
The South Carolina Uninsured Motorist Law, modeled after
the Virginia act, was enacted in 1959, amended in minor re-
spects in 1960, and drastically amended by the 1963 General
Assembly.'
The law was passed as an amendment to the Safety Re-
sponsibility Act2 and requires all automobile liability insur-
ance policies issued or delivered after January 1, 1961, to
contain an endorsement or provision undertaking to pay the
insured all sums which he is legally entitled to recover as
damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle within specified limits. The burden of providing this
protection was placed solely upon insurance companies, who,
until January 1, 1961, were allowed by the law to charge for
this protection and to furnish it only when purchased by an
insured.3
*This article will not deal with any of the sections of the act relat-
ing to the uninsured motorist fund.
tMeKay, McKay, Black & Walker, Columbia, S. C.
*Whaley & McCutchen, Columbia, S. C.
1. The South Carolina uninsured motorist law is now contained in
S. C. CODE §46-750.11 (1962).
2. Prior to the 1963 amendment only section 46-750.11 and sections
46-750.14 through 46-750.18 comprised the uninsured motorist act. Sec-
tions 46-750.12 and 46-750.19 through 46-750.28 dealt with a "Motor
Vehicle Liability Policy" which was defined in section 46-702 as "an
owners or operators policy of liability insurance, certified as provided in
section 46-748 or 46-749 as proof of financial responsibility and issued,
except as otherwise provided in section 46-749, by the insurance carrier
duly authorized to transact business in this State, to or for the benefit
of the person named therein as insured." In the case of Barkley v. Inter-
national Mut. Ins. Co., 227 S.C. 38, 86 S.E.2d 602 (1955), the court held
that only those liability insurance policies issued pursuant to the Safety
Responsibility Act need contain those provisions relating to a "Motor
Vehicle Liability Policy."
3. A self-insurer would seem to be excluded from providing uninsured
motorist coverage on its motor vehicles. The act requires that "no policy
or contract" of liability insurance shall be issued in this State unless it
contains the uninsured motorist endorsement. Section 46-750.11 (1). It
is obvious that a self-insurer does not issue liability insurance policies
and there is no specific requirement that it provide the uninsured motor-
ist endorsement. The legislature has specifically excluded a self-insurer
from furnishing uninsured motorist protection. Thus where a self-in-
sured motor vehicle is bailed to another who has no independent liability
coverage, the innocent victim of the bailee's negligence is without unin-
sured motorist protection. The bailed motor vehicle would not be defined
739
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PURPOSE
In the year beginning November 1, 1961, and ending Oc-
tober 31, 1962, there were approximately 29,968 declared un-
insured vehicles in the State of South Carolina, which
amounted to 3.39 per cent of the total number of vehicles reg-
istered in this state at that time.4 This total did not include
cancellations, forfeitures or denials of coverage which add
materially to the number of uninsured motor vehicles. One
can readily see, therefore, that the subject of the uninsured
motorist in South Carolina merits consideration. 5
Uninsured motorist insurance is of recent origin. Its pur-
pose is to relieve the problems arising from injuries inflicted
by negligent motorists who are uninsured and financially
irresponsible, as well as to provide recompense to innocent
persons who are injured and to defendents of those who are
killed. 6
PERSONS ENTITLED TO PROTECTION UNDER THE
UNINSURED MOTORIST LAW
There are generally three classes of persons insured under
the law3 The first class comprises the named insured and,
while a resident of the same household, the spouse of the
named insured and the relatives of either. The second class
is composed of those persons who use, with the express or
implied consent of the named insured, the motor vehicle to
which the policy applies. The third class is a guest in any
as an uninsured motor vehicle because of the required bond or cash de-
posit in lieu of liability insurance. Therefore, there would be no funds
from which an innocent victim could recover. The bailor would not be
responsible for the torts of the bailee unless the bailor was negligent in
furnishing the motor vehicle to the bailee. Howle v. McDaniel, 232 S.C.
125, 101 S.E.2d 255 (1957); Eberhardt v. Forrester, 241 S.C. 399, 128
S.E.2d 687 (1962). In these novel circumstances although the bailee is
uninsured the innocent victim would be unable to qualify under his un-
insured motorist endorsement since he would not have been involved in
an accident with "an uninsured motor vehicle."
4. Statistics obtained from Uninsured Motorist Section, South Caro-
lina Highway Department.
5. For an excellent discussion of the Virginia Act see the articles
of Colin Denny, III, contained in 47 Virginia Law Review 145, and 48
Virginia Law Review 170.
6. American Universal Ins. Co. v. Ranson, 59 Wash.2d 811, 370 P.2d
867, 79 A.L.R.2d 122 (1962); 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw §4331 (1962);
5A AMI. JuR. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE §82.5 (1936).
7. S.C. CODE §46-750.11(3) (c) (1962).
740 [Vol. 15
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such motor vehicle." The personal representative of any of
the three classes is likewise designated an insured.
The first class is afforded protection twenty-four hours a
day against injury from an uninsured motorist.9 A mem-
ber of this class is not only covered while using the insured
vehicle, but also while occupying another vehicle or while a
pedestrian. Regardless of the number of automobiles owned
by the named insured, his spouse or the relatives of either who
are members of his household, only one uninsured motorist
endorsement is needed to protect members of this first class.' 0
The second and third classes are insured only during their
occupancy of the insured vehicle and while it is being used
with the expressed or implied permission of the named in-
sured.
THE UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE
There are two requirements necessary to invoke uninsured
motorist coverage. First a person must qualify as an insured
within one of the above three classes, and second, he must be
involved in an accident with an uninsured motor vehicle."
An uninsured motor vehicle is defined by the law as one
which (1) there is no automobile liability insurance in the
amount of 10-20-5,12 or (2) the insurance company carrying
such insurance successfully denies coverage;' 3 or (3) there
8. Section 46-750.11(3) (c) restricts uninsured motorist coverage to
non-paying passengers since it uses the term "Guest." This eliminates
uninsured motorist coverage on commercial vehicles. In Hobbs v. Buckeye
Union Cas. Co., 212 F. Supp. 349 (W.D.Va. 1962), this construction was
commented on but not passed upon because of a broader policy provision.
9. Hobbs v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., supra note 8.
10. Section 46-750.11(3) (c); comment, 48 CALIF. L. Ray. 516 (1960).
11. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harleyville Mut. Cas. Co., 203 Va.
600, 125 S.E.2d 840 (1962).
12. Section 46-750.11(1) and 46-750.11 (3) (B).
13. Section 46-750.11(3) (B) (b). In Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Harley-
ville Mut. Cas. Co., 203 Va. 600, 125 S.E.2d 840 (1962), a motor vehicle
covered by Harleyville was involved in an accident in which was riding
Nationwide's insured guest. Harleyville denied coverage because of non-
permissive use. Nationwide instituted this action for a declaratory judg-
ment alleging that Harleyville provided uninsured motorist protection to
the guest passenger because of two requirements: ". . . first, such person
must qualify as an 'insured' under the endorsement of the policy upon
which claim is being made; and secondly, that such person must be in-
volved in an accident with the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle." In this case Harleyville's policy did not apply to the automobile
at the time of the accident; therefore, the passenger was not a guest in
the automobile to which the policy applied.
Prior to the 1963 amendment the mere denial of coverage by an in-
surance company would in itself render a vehicle uninsured. The fact
19631
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is no bond or deposit of cash or securities ;14 or (4) the owner
or operator be unknown;' or (5) the insurance company is
insolvent.10 Our statute requires minimum coverage and
should a motor vehicle carry liability insurance in an amount
less than the amounts specified, such a motor vehicle will be
considered an uninsured motor vehicle, falling within class
one.
If an owner or operator of a motor vehicle is unknown it
shall be deemed uninsured. This is the phantom driver which
has been designated "John Doe" by the legislature.
OMNIBUS CLAUSE
Enacted as a part of the South Carolina Uninsured Mo-
torist Law is a statutory omnibus clause which is mandatory
in all policies of automobile liability insurance. This clause
provides that
no policy or contract of bodily injury liability insurance
or of property damage liability insurance, covering lia-
bility arising from the ownership, maintenance or use
of any motor vehicle, shall be issued or delivered in this
state to the owner of such vehicle, or shall be issued or
delivered by an insurer licensed in this State upon any
motor vehicle then principally garaged or principally
used in this State, unless it contains a provision insuring
the person defined as insured,17 against loss from the
liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of such motor vehicle
within the United States of America or the Dominion of
Canada, subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs,
with respect to each motor vehicle, as follows: ten thou-
sand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of any
one person in any one accident, and, subject to such
limit for one person, twenty thousand dollars because of
bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any
that the denial was in bad faith or unjustified was immaterial. The law
now requires that an insurance company must "successfully" deny cover-
age before a motor vehicle is uninsured. The word "successfully" con-
notes a favorable result rather than an attempt. Until there has been an
adjudication that an insurance company has "successfully" denied cov-
erage the insured would not be entitled to uninsured motorist protection.
14. Section 46-750.11(3) (B) (d).
15. Section 46-750.11(3) (B).
16. Section 46-750.11(3) (B) (c).
17. Section 46-750.11(3) (c).
[Vol. 15
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one accident, and five thousand dollars because of in-
jury to or destruction of property of others in any one
accident.'
This section requires that "No policy or contract of bodily
injury liability insurance" shall be issued or delivered in this
state unless it contains the provision of this section, and pro-
vides that the policy insure "against loss from the liability
imposed by law." Uninsured motorist coverage, however,
is for the benefit of the insured and does not insure "against
liability imposed by law." Otherwise why should the limiting
language used in Section 46-750.11 (2) refer to "an endorse-
ment or provision" while Section 46-750.11 (1) uses the
broader language "no policy or contract of bodily injury lia-
bility insurance' The legislature by using this differing
language clearly recognized the distinction between liability
coverage and the uninsured motorist endorsement. Virginia
had, upon the adoption of its uninsured motorist act, a statu-
tory omnibus clause pertaining to automobile liability insur-
ance policies.19 South Carolina, however, upon the adoption
of its uninsured motorist law originally had no statutory omni-
bus clause except that section of the South Carolina Safety
Responsibility Act which had been construed in the case of
Barkley v. International Mut. Ins. Co. 2 0 as applying only to
those policies issued pursuant to the Safety Responsibility
Act.21
The legislature in the 1963 amendment authorized an "au-
tomobile liability policy" to exclude the following risks: (1) li-
ability under the Workmen's Compensation Law; (2) liability
to an employee of an insured while engaged in the employ-
ment, other than domestic, of the insured; (3) liability to
one engaged in the operation, maintenance or repair of the
motor vehicle; or (4) liability for damage to property owned
by, rented to, or in charge of or transported by the insured.22
18. Section 46-750.11 (1).
19. Strom v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 199 Va. 130, 97 S.E.2d 759
(1957).
20. 227 S.C. 38, 86 S.E.2d 602 (1955); see Booth v. American Cas.
Co., 261 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1958); State Farm Mut. v. Cooper, 233 F.2d
500 (4th Cir. 1956).
21. Cf. Hunter, Adm'r v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 241
S.C. 446, 129 S.E.2d 59 (1962). See Smitke v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
-Minn.-, 118 N.W.2d 217 (1962), where it held that the plaintiff, a
member of the class insured 24 hours a day was denied uninsured motor-
ist protection because he was the owner of a private passenger vehicle
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Had South Carolina not had a statutory omnibus clause, it
would have been unnecessary to provide for these exclusions
in an automobile liability policy. It is well settled that some
of these exclusions were authorized in this state without statu-
tory sanction.
28
THE UNINSURED MOTORISTS ENDORSEMENT
The heart of the Uninsured Motorist law is that section
which requires all contracts of automobile liability insurance
issued or delivered after January 1, 1961,24 by an insurer li-
censed in this state upon any motor vehicle then principally
garaged or principally used in this state to contain the
uninsured motorist endorsement.25 The effect of the law was
to write this endorsement or provision in all automobile
liability policies regardless of whether it was actually
contained therein.20  However, if a motor vehicle was prin-
cipally garaged or principally used in another state at the
time the policy was issued, the law is inapplicable and there
would be no uninsured motorist protection even though the
collision occurred in South Carolina and the insured was then
a residence of this state.27 The uninsured motorist protection
afforded a motor vehicle meeting the requirements of Section
46-750.11 (1) is good throughout the territorial limits of the
United States and Canada.28 This section also requires min-
imum policy limits of 10-20-5 but the insurer is allowed to
exclude the first two hundred dollars of property damage.29
23. Pardee v. Fidelity Cas. Co. of N.Y., 235 S.C. 521, 112 S.E.2d 497
(1960); see also Ellis v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of N. Y., 187 S.C.
162, 197 S.E. 510 (1938); Annot. 50 A.L.R.2d 78.
24. If a valid policy was issued or delivered prior to January 1, 1961,
and an accident involving an uninsured motorist occurred after that date,
no uninsured motorist coverage would be available since no policy or
contract of liability insurance was issued or delivered after January 1,
1961, unless the insured voluntarily purchased the optional uninsured
motorist coverage. The contention that all existing liability insurance
policies automatically contained an uninsured motorists endorsement on
January 1, 1961, is invalid for such would be a violation of Article I,
Section 8, South Carolina Constitution and Article 1, Section 10, United
States Constitution prohibiting the impairment of vested contractual
rights. See Ball v. Calif. State Auto. Associates Inter-Ins. Bureau, 20
Cal. Reptr. 31. (1962).
25. 46-750.11(2).
26. Blackwell v. United Ins. Co. of America, 231 S.C. 535, 99 S.E.2d
414 (1957); Rogers v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 135 S.C. 89, 133 S.E. 215,
45 A.L.R. 1172 (1926).
27. Section 46-750.11 (1).
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The uninsured motorist endorsement must contain a pro-
vision undertaking to pay the insured "all sums which he
shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner
or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle." Recovery under
this endorsement is subject to the condition that the insured
establish legal liability on the part of the uninsured motorist. 30
In an action against the uninsured motorist the only issues
to be determined are liability and the amount of damage, and
once judgement is entered, these issues cannot be relitigated.
Until final judgment is entered against the uninsured motor-
ist, a direct action cannot be brought against the insurance
carrier.3 1 In an action against a known or unknown unin-
sured motorist, the insurance carrier is precluded from rais-
ing policy defenses since such an action is one ex delicto. But
an action against the company is an action ex contractu
brought to recover from the insurance company on its en-
dorsement, and since this is an action based on contract, policy
defenses may properly be raised by the company.32
JOHN DOE ACTIONS
In order to fully carry out the purpose of the Uninsured
Motorist Law the legislature had to solve the problem of the
hit-and-run motorist who leaves innocent victims with no
method of recovery. Our law, therefore, provides that if the
owner or operator of any vehicle causing injury or damage
be unknown, an action may be instituted against the unknown
motorist as "John Doe." 33
30. Section 46-750.11(7).
31. The South Carolina legislature has clearly shown its intent that
an insured cannot maintain an action on the policy to require the insurer
to pay him his damages without having first brought suit against the un-
insured. Section 46-750.11(2) requires the insurer to undertake "to pay
the insured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as dam-
ages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle." Arbi-
tration being expressly prohibited, a judgment is necessary to establish
what damages the insured is "legally entitled" to recover. If this had
not been the intent of the legislature there would not have been any
reason for the obvious fiction of the John Doe action as provided in Sec-
tion 46-750.11(5). It would have been far simpler to provide for direct
action against the insurer. See Levy v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 31 Ill.
App. 2d 157, 175 N.E.2d 607 (1961); Kirovac v. Healey, 104 N.H. 157,
181 A.2d 634 (1962); Rogers v. Danko, 204 Va. 140, 129 S.E.2d 828
(1963). The law now gives the company the right to defend the unin-
sured motorist. To allow a direct action against the insurance company
would abrogate this statutory right.
32. Doe v. Brown, 203 Va. 508, 125 S.E.2d 159 (1962); Rogers v.
Danko, 204 Va. 140, 129 S.E.2d 828 (1963).
$3. Section 46-750.11(5).
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"... John Doe is a fictitious person created under the
provisions of the Statute to stand in the place of the unknown
motorist. John Doe is not a person but for the purposes of
this proceeding speaks through the insurance company. The
insurance company, which is the party ultimately liable under
the provisions of its policy for payment of a judgment
obtained against John Doe speaks and defends the action
through and in the name of John Doe." 84
Service of process is perfected upon "John Doe" by deliver-
ing a copy of the summons and complaint to the clerk of court
for the county in which the action is brought and serving one
upon the insurance company issuing the policy.35 It is the
service of process upon the company which gives it the right
to file pleadings and take any other action allowable by law
in the name of John Doe. 86
There is nothing in our law relating to the proper venue of
a suit instituted against an unknown uninsured motorist. It
has been held in a recent Virginia decision3 7 that an unknown
uninsured motorist may be sued in any county where the in-
surance company can be sued, since a suit against John Doe
is in effect a suit against the company. With this reasoning
we cannot agree. As Justice Whittle pointed out in his dis-
senting opinion, the action against John Doe is one ex delicto,
not ex contractu. Since the insurance company is not a party
defendant to that suit, venue cannot be based upon the in-
surer's residence. The real defendant, John Doe, being un-
known, venue should not be based upon his unknown resi-
dence; the suit should be brought where the cause of action
arose. The hardships worked against the company in bring-
ing witnesses from out of state to South Carolina could be
staggering. The proper procedure would be to require the
insured to bring his tort suit against John Doe where the
cause of action arose and then pursue his action against the
insurance company in South Carolina for the collection of
his judgment.
34. Doe v. Brown, 203 Va. 508, 125 S.E.2d 159 (1962) ; Doe v. Faulk-
ner, 263 Va. 522, 125 S.E.2d 169 (1962); Hodgsen v. Doe, 203 Va. 938,
128 S.E.2d 444 (1962).
35. Section 46-750.11(5); 46-750.11(2).
36. Section 46-750.11 (5) State Farm Mut. Auto. Ass'n v. Duncan,
203 Va. 440, 125 S.E.2d 154 (1962).
37. Mangum v. Doe, 203 Va. 518, 125 S.E.2d 166 (1962).
[Vol. 15
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When the identity of the uninsured motorist is known, the
action must be brought in the county in which the defendant
uninsured motorist resides. To allow otherwise would be to
violate a substantial right of the defendant.38 It should be
remembered that a defendant does not give up any of his
legal rights, constitutional or otherwise, merely because he is
an uninsured motorist. A motorist may be uninsured for sev-
eral reasons. Probably more motorists become uninsured due
to policy cancellations and lapses than to any other cause.
Since the uninsured motorist is bound by the judgment en-
tered against him, he has a right to be tried in the county of
his residence.
Where the owner or operator of a motor vehicle is unknown,
there can be no right of action or recovery unless: (1) the
accident was reported to the appropriate police authority
within a reasonable length of time; (2) there was physical
contact between the insured and unknown vehicle; and (3)
the insured was not negligent in not ascertaining the identity
of the uninsured motorist.3 9 These requirements were un-
doubtedly enacted to protect the insurance companies from
fraudulent claims.
Neither the bringing of an action nor the entry of judgment
against John Doe constitutes a bar to the insured from later
bringing an action against such owner or operator whose
identity is subsequently discovered. However, the insurance
company is subrogated to the amount paid the insured, but
must also pay its proportionate part of any reasonable costs,
38. Section 10-303.
39. Section 46-750.11(4). There was nothing in our law prior to the
1963 amendment which required physical contact between the insured
and uninsured motor vehicle. The law allowed the insured to collect from
his insurance company "all sums which he shall be legally entitled to re-
cover as damages from the owner or operator of an insured motor ve-
hicle." Section 46-750.14. The law further provided "nor may anything
be required of the insured except the establishment of legal liability."
Section 46-750.18. Since the insured can establish "legal liability" with-
out physical contact any policy provision which required physical contact
was invalid as contrary to the provisions of the law. It is settled in
South Carolina that it is not necessary to the establishment of legal
liability that there be physical contact between two motor vehicles.
Green v. Sparks, 232 S.C. 414, 102 S.E.2d 435 (1958); see also Doe v.
Brown, 203 Va. 508, 125 S.E.2d 149 (1962).
In Mangum v. Doe, 203 Va. 518, 125 S.E.2d 166 (1962), the court
construed the act as requiring an insured to exercise due diligence or care
to ascertain the indentity of an unknown motorist causing injury or
damage. The legislature by this section has expressly overruled this
result.
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expenses and reasonable attorney's fees.40 Should the inden-
tity of the unknown owner or operator become known during
the pendency of an action aginst John Doe, our statute spe-
cifically authorizes the joinder "of any other person."'41 If
the known defendant turns out to be in fact insured, obviously
the insured's uninsured motorist carrier would be relieved of
any further obligation with respect to a judgment recovered
against the known insured motorist.
SUBROGATION
An insurer paying a claim under the uninsured motorist
endorsement is subrogated to the rights of the insured, to the
extent of its payment, against the uninsured motorist.42 How-
ever, a workmen's compensation carrier and a collision insurer
are never subrogated to the rights of the insured under the
uninsured motorist endorsement. Both of these carriers are
subrogated against the uninsured motorist but not against the
contract rights of the insured.
43
In the Virginia case of Home v. Superior Life Ins. Co.,44 an
employee filed a claim against his employer for compensation
benefit for injuries sustained. The industrial comnission de-
nied the claim because the employee had executed a release to
his uninsured motorist insurer and thereby destroyed his em-
ployer's right to subrogation. The court allowed a recovery
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, however, because
the endorsement provides coverage for the insured motorist
and not for the uninsured motorist. The uninsured motorist
company's liability to its insured is contractual, even though
based upon the contingency of a third party's tort liability.
Therefore, the workmen's compensation carrier was not
subrogated to the rights of the insured under the uninsured
motorist endorsement and the release given by the employee
did not destroy its right of subrogation.
40. Section 46-750.11(6). As to attorney's fees in other than a John
Doe action, see the case of Remsen v. Midway Liquors, Inc., 30 Ill. App.
2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 7 (1961), wherein the court allowed the plaintiff's
attorney reasonable attorney's fee deductible from the proceeds from
which the insurance company had a subrogation interest.
41. Section 46-750.11(5).
42. Section 46-750.11 (6).
43. Home v. Superior Life Ins. Co., 203 Va. 282, 123 S.E.2d 401
(1962).
44. 203 Va. 282, 123 S.E.2d 401 (1962).
[Vol. 15
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In Jarrett v. Allstate Ins. Co.45 the insured sought unin-
sured motorist coverage after recovering workmen's compen-
sation benefits from his employer. The court allowed an off-
set against the uninsured motorist endorsement for all sums
paid by the workmen's compensation carrier. Indicating that
a workmen's compensation carrier was not subrogated to the
proceeds of its employee under the endorsement, the court
said:
This section of the policy does not apply: "... so as to
enure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any work-
men's compensation carrier or any person or organization
qualified as a self-insurer under any workmen's com-
pensation law." . . . [s]uch language indicates that the
parties did not intend to make a contract for the benefit
of a third person, i.e., the compensation carrier, but that
it was their intention that in any one accident involving
an uninsured motorist the insured would receive the sum
of at least $10,000 for his injuries.
Our law authorizes the uninsured motorist carrier to ex-
clude any liability for property damage for which an insured
has been compensated by insurance or otherwise.4 6 Most un-
insured motorist endorsements provide that "with respect to
property damage the insurance afforded under this coverage
shall be excess insurance over any other valid and collectible
insurance against such property damage." This exclusion
would prevent subrogation by a collision insurer even if it
could be subrogated to the contract rights of its insured. The
above mentioned exclusion would also operate to prevent the
insured from collecting under his collision coverage and re-
covering again under the uninsured motorist endorsement.
The Home case also held that the employer's right of sub-
rogation against the negligent third party is superior to that
of the insurer under the uninsured motorist law. The court
considered the public policy, legislative intent and welfare
aspects of the workmen's compensation act in arriving at this
conclusion. There is no such reasoning which applies to a
collision insurer; therefore, it would seem that the collision
insurer and the uninsured motorist's carrier would share
equal priority to the assets of the uninsured motorist.
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ARBITRATION
Arbitration of claims under the uninsured motorists en-
dorsement is prevented in South Carolina by statute47 as
well as by decision. 48 The section of the law barring arbitra-
tion states that the insured shall not be prevented or restricted
in any manner from employing legal counsel or instituting
legal proceeding.
49
DEFENSE OF AN UNINSURED MOTORIST
The insurance company has a right to defend a known or
unknown uninsured motorist.5 0 Copies of the pleading must
be served upon the company who shall have the right to appear
and defend in the name of the uninsured motorist within 20
days after service upon it. "A copy of the process must be
served on the insurance company before it may be held liable
under the uninsured motorist act. The language employed is
mandatory and establishes a condition precedent to the bene-
fits of statute unless waived by the insurance company." 51
An insurance company can only be served in this state by
service upon the Insurance Commissioner, 2 and this proced-
ure must be followed to commence uninsured motorist actions.
However, there is no duty on the company to defend the un-
insured motorist either under the standard endorsement or
the South Carolina Uninsured Motorist Law. Most uninsured
47. Section 46-750.11(7).
48. Childs v. Allstate Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 455, 117 S.E.2d 867 (1961).
49. Section 46-750.11(7).
50. Section 46-750.11(2). Prior to the 1963 amendment the uninsured
motorist law as adopted in South Carolina contained no provision relating
to the defense of a known uninsured motorist by an insurance company.
The courts are in general agreement that the insurance company is
bound by the judgment obtained against the uninsured motorist by the
insured motorist. The general rule is that an automobile liability in-
surer is bound by the result of litigation only when it has notice of the
action and an opportunity to control its proceedings. 9 APPLEMAN IN-
SURANC LAW §4860 (1962), 5A Am. Jun. Automobile Insurance §191,
(1936). Apparently this is the rule in South Carolina. Carolina Veneer &
L. Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 103, 24 S.E.2d 153 (1943).
Being bound by the prior adjudication, the insurance company has the
right to defend the uninsured motorist. Levy v. American Auto. Ins. Co.,
31 Ill. App. 2d 157, 175 N.E.2d 607 (1961); Kirovac v. Healey, 104 N.H.
157, 181 A.2d 634 (1962); Rogers v. Danko, 204 Va. 140, 129 S.E.2d
828 (1963). In Missouri ex reL, State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Craig, 364
S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1963) the court held that the insurance company could
intervene as a matter of right to defend a known uninsured motorist.
See S.C. CODE, §10-219 (1962).
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motorist endorsements carry a "notice of legal action" clause.5 3
In the case of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duncan54 the
court stated that
the obvious purpose of the "notice of legal action" pro-
vision is to give the insurance company notice of the in-
stitution of a suit by its insured against an uninsured
motorist in order that the company may inquire into the
matter and take such steps as it deems necessary to pro-
tect its interests. It is vitally interested in such a suit
in two ways. Under the terms of its policy it will have to
pay whatever judgment its insured may recover against
the uninsured motorist ... [u]pon the payment of such
claim, it is subrogated to the rights of its insured against
such uninsured motorist.
The "notice of legal action" clause does not conflict with any
provision of our law but is supplemental to the section requir-
ing service of process upon the company.
In order to recover under the uninsured motorist endorse-
ment it must be established that the owner or operator of the
adverse motor vehicle was in fact uninsured. 5 This burden
rests upon the insured. Should the record be silent on this
question then the insured has failed to bring himself within
the terms of the law.
The uninsured motorist endorsement in most policies con-
tains a clause requiring the insured to submit to a physical
examination when requested by the company. In at least two
cases the court noted that the insured submitted to a physical
examination upon the request of the company pursuant to the
policy provisions. 56 Most policies likewise provide that the
insured must co-operate with the company.57 These two re-
quirements are not in conflict with the statute and must be
complied with.
53. "If, before the company makes payment of loss hereunder, the
insured or his legal representative shall institute any legal action for
bodily injury or property damage against any person or organization
legally responsible for the use of an automobile involved in the accident,
a copy of the Summons and Complaint or other process served in con-
nection with such legal action shall be forwarded immediately to the
company by the insured or his legal representative."
54. 203 Va. 440, 125 S.E.2d 154 (1962).
55. Levy v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 31 I1. App. 2d 157, 175 N.E.2d
607 (1961).
56. Levy v. American Auto. Ins. Co., supra note 55.
57. Pharr v. Canal Ins. Co., 233 S.C. 266, 104 S.E.2d 394 (1958).
1963]
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INSURANCE FOR THE INSURED
It seems to be well settled that "the effect of the uninsured
motorist law is not to provide insurance coverage upon each
and every uninsured vehicle but is to provide coverage to the
insured motorist."581 Accordingly, when an insured motorist
is involved in an accident with two uninsured vehicles, this
will not increase the coverage available to the insured under
the endorsement. 0
Payment of an amount in settlement by the carrier to the
insured and the execution of a policy release will not absolve
the uninsured motorist from liability. The uninsured motor-
ist's carrier is not a joint tort-feasor with the uninsured mo-
torist; the obligations of the uninsured motorist's carrier are
based solely on contract. The law provides for subr@gation
against the uninsured motorist upon payment to its insured,
and a policy release obtained from the insured will have no
effect upon the uninsured motorist's liability.60
AMOUNT OF RECOVERY
Many problems arise concerning multiple coverage under
the uninsured motorist law. One such problem was discussed
in a recent case which held that where a guest passenger oc-
cupies the status of an insured under both his host's and his
own policy, the host's uninsured motorist protection is the
prime coverage, the guest's uninsured motorist coverage being
excess.(" The excess clause, being valid, requires that the
host's limits be exhausted before recovery can be had under
the guest's uninsured motorist endorsement. 62 Further, where
the prime coverage is exhausted the excess insurer need not
provide uninsured motorist coverage to its insured where
58. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Drewry, 191 F. Supp. 852
(W. D. Va. 1961); Kirovac v. Healy, 104 N.H. 157, 181 A.2d 634 (1962).
59. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Drewry, supra note 58; Drewry
v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Va. 231, 129 S.E.2d 681 (1963).
60. Home v. Superior Life Ins. Co., 203 Va. 282, 123 S.E.2d 401
(1962); and Kirovac v. Healey, 181 A.2d 634 (N.H. 1962).
61. "With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an
automobile not owned by the named insured under this coverage, the
insurance hereunder shall apply only as excess insurance over any other
similar insurance available to such occupant, and this insurance shall
then apply only in the amount by which the applicable limit of liability
of this coverage exceeds the sum of the applicable limits of liability of
all such other insurance."
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there is other valid and collectible insurance available at the
time of the accident, both policies containing identical policy
limits.6 3 And this follows even though the primary coverage
is not exhausted until a judgment is obtained.
Most uninsured motorist endorsements provide that a re-
covery made under the liability portion of the policy reduces
the amount collectible under the uninsured motorist endorse-
ment. This situation would occur if a guest were injured as
a result of the concurrent gross negligence of the host driver
and the negligence of an uninsured motorist. A guest would
be an insured under the host's uninsured motorist endorse-
ment and would also have a cause of action against the host
driver for which the insurance company would have liability
coverage. It seems to us that the insurance company can limit
its coverage to the minimum amounts required by the Unin-
sured Motorists Law.
64
The problem of excess coverage has also arisen where an
insured is covered by more than one policy in the same house-
hold, i.e., where there are two insured motor vehicles contain-
ing the uninsured motorist endorsement. Most policies con-
tain a pro-rata clause limiting liability to the minimums
required by the law. This limitation does not contravene any
requirement of the uninsured motorists law and, therefore,
is valid.
CONCLUSION
From our analysis of the Uninsured Motorists Law we are
of the opinion that the courts will require an insured to strict-
ly comply with all procedural aspects of the law and the policy.
However, when dealing with the question of coverage, a liberal
view will be taken. Most of the policy provisions placed in
the uninsured motorist endorsement are required by statute.
Being mandatory, these provisions should not be construed
against the company. Those provisions of the endorsement
relating to procedure are a justifiable attempt by the com-
panies to place themselves in a position to properly evaluate
the insured's claim, and they should be fairly construed and
endorsed by our courts. For an insured to deliberately refuse
63. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wells, 316 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1963), over-
ruling Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wells, 209 F. Supp. 784 (W. D. Va. 1962).
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to comply with the provisions of his policy would clearly op-
erate to deny the company its fair protection. However, as
far as the question of coverage is concerned, the court will,
in carrying out the intent of the law, provide coverage within
the basic limits if at all possible.
16
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